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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to sections 78-3 la-19(l) and 78-
2a-3(2)(j) of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1996). 
ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that there was no agreement between the 
parties to arbitrate their dispute? 
a. Did the trial court err when it found that the defendant, Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Utah ("Blue Cross"), did not establish that it sent Mr. McCoy notice 
of its proposed amendment of his policy to provide for binding arbitration? 
b. If so, was mailing of the proposed amendment sufficient to bind Mr. 
McCoy to arbitrate his disputes with Blue Cross? 
c. Did the trial court err when it implicitly rejected Blue Cross's argument 
that Mr. McCoy agreed to arbitrate when he did not cancel his policy after learning 
of his right to arbitration? 
2. If the trial court erred, what is the proper remedy? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although some courts have said that the denial of a motion to compel arbitration 
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 
360 (Utah 1996), that is because the arbitrabihty of a dispute generally depends on contract 
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interpretation and is thus a legal issue, O 'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 901 
(10th Cir. 1992).1 The district court's underlying factual findings will be set aside only if 
they are clearly erroneous. UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a); O 'Connor, 965 F.2d at 901. See also 
Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 344 (8th Cir. 1990) ("when the determination 
of the arbitrability of a dispute is at issue, the district court's orders must be reviewed de 
novo only to the extent we are reviewing the actual language of the arbitration agreement"; 
"to the extent that the district court's order is based upon factual findings, our review is 
guided by the clearly erroneous standard"). 
Where the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is based on legal conclusions that 
are in turn based on factual findings, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the legal conclusions 
for correctness but upholds the trial court's underlying factual determinations where they are 
supported by the record. See Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 
360-61 (Utah 1992). 
1
 Both Sosa and the case it relied on for its statement of the standard of review 
involved underlying legal issues. The issue in Sosa was whether the contract was 
unconscionable, which is a question of law. See 924 P.2d at 360. The issue in Docutel 
Olivetti Corporation v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1996), the case Sosa 
relied on, was one of contract interpretation, see 731 P.2d at 479, which also ordinarily 
presents a question of law, Sacklerv. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). Here, on the 
other hand, the issue is whether there was an agreement to arbitrate the parties' dispute, 
which is generally a question of fact. See infra p. 3. 
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The existence of an arbitration agreement is generally a question of fact.2 See, e.g., 
RTKL Assocs., Inc. v. Four Villages Ltd. Partnership, 620 A.2d 351, 352 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App.), cert, denied, 626 A.2d 371 (Md. 1993); Ben-Reuven v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 526 
N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feldman, 409N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 
(App. Div. 1978), appeal denied, 390N.E.2d 1182 (N.Y. 1979); Hardin Constr. Group, Inc. 
v. Strictly Painting, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); Weber v. Hall, 929 
S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). 
A district court's findings regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement are 
generally reviewed like any other factual findings and are upheld unless clearly erroneous. 
Nordin, 897 F.2d at 344. Cf. Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 548 (8th Cir. 
1991) (a district court's findings on a motion to stay an action pending arbitration are treated 
the same as findings made after a bench trial and are reviewed for clear error). Cal 
Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (the 
findings of fact on which a trial court bases its legal conclusion that a contract exists are 
reviewed the same as other factual findings), ajfd, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995). 
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary foundation, 
is against the clear weight of the evidence or was induced by an erroneous view of the law 
2
 So is the question of whether Blue Cross mailed notice of the arbitration 
provision to Mr. McCoy. See Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647, 652 
n.2 (Utah Ct. App.) ("mailing of notice is an issue of fact"), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). 
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or "if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Blue Cross argues that the clearly erroneous standard of review does not apply here 
because the trial court's findings were based on affidavits and other documents. Although 
some courts (including this court) have stated that an appellate court may review a trial 
court's findings de novo where they are based solely on written materials, e.g., In re 
Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) says that a trial court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous," "whether based on oral or documentary evidence." Other courts have applied 
an "ameliorated" clearly erroneous standard where findings are based on written testimony. 
See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1349 & n.8 (11th 
Cir. 1982); Green v. Russell County, 603 F.2d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1979); McKensie v. Sea 
LandServ., Inc., 551 F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1977); Hilt v. Draper, 836 P.2d 558, 562 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1992); Trad Indus., Ltd. v. Brogan, 805 P.2d 54, 59 (Mont. 1991). Under this 
standard, the burden of establishing clear error is not so heavy, but deference is still given 
to the trial court, as the finder of fact, and its findings will not be disturbed if there is 
substantial competent evidence to support them. See Seaboard, 690 F.2d at 1349; Green, 
603 F.2d at 573-74; Hilt, 836 P.2d at 562. 
In Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360-61 (Utah 1992), 
the Utah Supreme Court applied the "clearly erroneous" standard to a trial court's factual 
findings that one party had participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration 
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and that the other party had been prejudiced thereby, even though the underlying facts were 
not disputed and the appellate court was therefore in as good a position as the trial court to 
resolve the issue. See 833 P.2d at 361-62 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf. 
Haywood v. Gill 16 Utah 2d 299, 400 P.2d 16, 18 (1965) (upholding findings based on 
documentary evidence, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary); Bass v. 
Englesath (In re Estate ofCustick), 842 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (if the trial court 
relies on extrinsic evidence to interpret an ambiguous document, its interpretation is a factual 
matter that will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous, even where the extrinsic 
evidence consists of other documents). This court should follow Chandler and uphold the 
trial court's factual findings if they are supported by the record.3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) governs the standard of review. Sections 78-3 la-3 
and -4 of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1996) require a valid written agreement to arbitrate 
before the court can compel arbitration. Former section 31-37-16(1) of the UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (Supp. 1985) (repealed 1985, effective 1986) governed the validity of 
3
 Blue Cross also argues that this court's review "must be conducted in light of 
the well established rule that under Utah law all doubts are resolved in favor of arbitration." 
(Br. of Appellant at 3-4 (citing Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359).) While arbitration is favored in Utah 
"in some cases," the public policy favoring arbitration only applies once an agreement to 
arbitrate has been established. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). No 
public pohcy favors finding an agreement where none exists. The existence of an arbitration 
agreement is determined in the same way as the existence of any other contract. See also 
infra point III. 
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endorsements to health insurance policies issued by nonprofit health service corporations 
such as Blue Cross at the time Blue Cross purported to amend its policy to include an 
arbitration provision. Section 31A-21-314(2) of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1994) and 
R590-122-4.3 & .5 of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (Supp. Oct 1, 1997) (formerly UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE R540-122-4.3 & .5 (1989)) govern arbitration provisions in insurance policies 
since 1987. Section 31A-21-106(2) of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (Supp. 1997) governs 
modifications of insurance policies since July 1, 1986. These statutes and rules are set out 
in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
After his wife, Frieda, died of breast cancer, the plaintiff Gerald McCoy, brought this 
action against Blue Cross alleging various claims arising out of Blue Cross's decision to deny 
Mrs. McCoy coverage for treatment she needed to save her life. (Record ("R.") 2-13.) 
Blue Cross filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. (R. 17-18.) 
It was undisputed that the policy Blue Cross had issued to Mr. McCoy did not require 
arbitration, but Blue Cross claimed that it had unilaterally amended the policy after it was 
issued to require mandatory arbitration of any dispute under the policy. 
Mr. McCoy responded to the motion by arguing that the arbitration provision Blue 
Cross relied on was unenforceable for a variety of reasons: (1) Mr. McCoy never agreed to 
arbitrate his claims and never received notice of the alleged amendment of the policy to add 
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an arbitration provision; (2) any agreement to arbitrate was invalid because it was 
fraudulently obtained; (3) the arbitration provision was unenforceable because the plaintiff 
had alleged fraud; (4) the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it was 
procedurally unconscionable; (5) the purported contract modification was not supported by 
consideration; and (6) Blue Cross could not enforce the supposed arbitration agreement 
because it had breached the policy's grievance procedures. (R. 60-78.) After two hearings 
(see R. 297 & 298) and supplemental briefing (R. 230-36, 254-60), the trial court found the 
first argument dispositive and did not reach the other arguments (R. 276-79). 
The trial court concluded that Blue Cross had not met its burden of establishing that 
it had ever sent Mr. McCoy notice of the purported amendment of the policy to require 
arbitration. (R. 279,1f 5.) Consequently, the court denied Blue Cross's motion to compel 
arbitration and stay the proceedings. (R. 279.) Blue Cross has appealed that decision. (R. 
281-83.) 
B. Statement of Facts 
In October 1985, Gerald McCoy changed his health insurance coverage from a group 
policy provided by Blue Cross through his former employer to an individual policy provided 
by Blue Cross known as the Qualifier I plan. (R. 80, f 2, & 88-114.) The policy did not 
contain an arbitration provision. (R. 80, ^ 3.) In connection with his change in health 
insurance, Mr. McCoy received a brochure explaining the Qualifier I plan. The brochure did 
not mention arbitration. (R. 80, f 4, & 115-22.) Mr. McCoy was the senior contract 
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manager on the Trans-Alaska pipeline and reviewed and managed other contracts 
professionally. He was aware of the importance of documenting changes in contracts and 
of the importance of record-keeping. (R 80, f 5.) His wife, Frieda, was a librarian and was 
also aware of the importance of record-keeping. (R. 80, f 6.) The two kept meticulous 
records. (SeeR. 81, % 7.) 
According to Edwina Green, a paralegal in the Blue Cross legal department, in the fall 
of 1985 Blue Cross decided to amend its policies to add a binding arbitration provision, 
effective January 1, 1986. (R. 31, ffif 2-3.) Ms. Green submitted an affidavit stating that in 
November 1985 she directed Blue Cross's programming department to prepare a tape of all 
subscribers who were insured under a Qualifier I Type 57H policy. They were to be sent a 
cover letter and an endorsement by December 1,1985. (R 31, ffij 4-5.) Among other things, 
the cover letter stated: 
[E]ffective January 1, 1986 we will adopt an arbitration procedure for the 
resolution of any disputes you may have with Blue Cross . . . . This will save 
you the trouble of having to go through the courts to settle a dispute with us, 
and should further save money on behalf of our subscribers. 
(R 34.)4 The endorsement purported to amend the "General Terms and Conditions" section 
of Blue Cross's policies to incorporate a binding arbitration provision. (R. 35.) 
In her affidavit, Ms. Green stated that Mr. McCoy was covered through a Qualifier 
I Type 57H policy since October 16,1985. (R 32, f 6.) Ms. Green could not say, however, 
4
 Despite Blue Cross's representation, the purported amendment of Mr. 
McCoy's policy did not save him money. (R. 85,129.) 
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that Mr. McCoy's name and address were actually on the tape that Blue Cross delivered to 
the printer or on the letters that the printer delivered to the mailing service, nor could she say 
that a letter addressed to Mr. McCoy was actually deposited in the mail. Blue Cross did not 
produce a copy of the tape showing that Mr. McCoy was included on the mailing list. 
The McCoys never received the letter or endorsement. (R. 81, fflf 7-10.) 
Sometime before 1994 Blue Cross purportedly issued revised versions of the Health 
Care Agreement for the Qualifier I Type 57H policy. (See R. 38-47A.) The McCoys never 
received a copy of the revised policies either. (R. 81, f^ 9.) 
The last revision, dated "7/89," set out a four-step "member grievance procedure" to 
resolve complaints regarding coverage. (R. 46.) The first step was to contact the Customer 
Service Department. If the grievance could not be resolved by telephone, "an investigation 
will be initiated when the grievance is received by the Plan and will result in a written 
decision, a copy of which will be sent to you." (R. 46.) The second step was a written 
appeal to the Claims Appeal Committee. This appeal was to be made within sixty days after 
receiving notification of the Customer Service Department's decision, and the Claims Appeal 
Committee had sixty days to reach a decision and notify the insured of the decision in 
writing. The third step was to appeal to Blue Cross's General Counsel, in which case "[a]n 
investigation will be completed within ten (10) working days and you will receive written 
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notification of the decision." (R.46.) The fourth and final step was binding arbitration. (R. 
46.)5 
By March 1994 Mrs. McCoy had been diagnosed with breast cancer. Chemotherapy 
had been ineffective. Mrs. McCoy's treating physician, Dr. Patrick G. Beatty, recommended 
that she receive high dose chemotherapy with peripheral stem cell rescue (HDCT/PSCR). 
Time was critical. If the treatment was to be effective, Mrs. McCoy needed it right away. 
The McCoys asked Blue Cross to preauthorize this treatment, but Blue Cross refused. (R. 
81, If 11.) Blue Cross told the McCoys that their request was denied "for medical necessity" 
and because "[t]he patient has no obvious disease and has had no chemotherapy." (R. 123.) 
These statements were flat-out wrong, and Blue Cross knew they were wrong. Mrs. McCoy 
had cancer; she had been through chemotherapy; and she would die without the requested 
treatment. The McCoys and their physicians had provided Blue Cross with documents 
showing that the reasons it gave for its denial were wrong. (R. 81, f^ 11.) Nevertheless, Blue 
Cross denied the request. 
On May 25, 1994, Mr. McCoy faxed to Blue Cross a package of materials appealing 
Blue Cross's denial and again requesting approval of HDCT/PSCR for Mrs. McCoy. Mr. 
McCoy received a confirmation that the fax was received. Mr. McCoy did not hear anything 
5
 An earlier version of the policy included yet another step before binding 
arbitration. The insured could "submit a report to the Consumer Service Division of the Utah 
State Insurance Department for consideration." (R. 40.) There was no evidence that the 
Insurance Department was even set up to handle such appeals. (See Tr., 2-6-98, R.298, at 
15.) 
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from Blue Cross for over a month. On June 30, 1994, he called the Medical Claims section 
and was told that they had no record of his appeal but that someone would call him back the 
next day. When he had not heard anything by July 5, 1994, Mr. McCoy wrote to Blue Cross 
again, requesting "an immediate response in writing to [his] appeal." (R. 82,113, & 124.) 
On July 14, 1994, Blue Cross wrote to Mr. McCoy to say that it had received the 
information he had submitted and that Blue Cross's Appeals Committee would make a 
decision as soon as an independent medical adviser had reviewed the medical information. 
(R. 82, f 14, & 125.) 
The McCoys did not hear anything more from Blue Cross until they received a letter 
dated September 29, 1994, upholding the decision to deny Mrs. McCoy treatment, on the 
grounds that the McCoys' policy "specifically excludes bone marrow transplant services in 
the treatment of breast cancer." (R. 82, If 4, & 126.) In fact, the McCoys' policy included 
no such exclusion. (See R. 99-102.) 
On October 3,1994, the McCoys appealed the Appeals Committee's decision to Blue 
Cross's general counsel, Frank Pignanelli. (R. 83, % 16, & 127.) Mr. Pignanelli responded 
on October 19, 1994, by asking for ten more working days to review Mrs. McCoy's medical 
records and respond to the appeal because "the file in this matter is rather extensive." (R. 
128.) 
On November 3, 1994, Mr. Pignanelli wrote to Mr. McCoy asking for information 
about other insurance. (R. 129-30.) Mr. McCoy responded that he did not see how other 
insurance the McCoys might have was relevant to the issue of coverage under the Blue Cross 
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policy. (R. 131.)6 On January 13, 1995, Mr. Pignanelli wrote to Mr. McCoy stating that 
Blue Cross did not have to make any determination of benefits due under the policy because 
the McCoys had not responded to Blue Cross's request for information about other health 
insurance. In any event, Mr. Pignanelli stated, "the decision of the Benefit Appeals 
Committee is correct." (R. 132.) 
Thus, in a case of life or death where time was of the essence, over a period often 
months Blue Cross had gone from "you're not sick and don't need the treatment" to "we 
don't cover if to "someone else should pay for it." Blue Cross's treatment of the McCoys' 
claim not only violated its own policies for resolving disputes over claims but also violated 
Utah law, which requires the insurer to acknowledge receipt of a claim within 15 days, 
provide substantive responses to pertinent communications from a claimant within 15 days, 
complete its investigation of the claim within 45 days and advise the claimant of the 
acceptance or denial of a claim within 30 days after receipt of a notice of loss. See UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE R590-89-10, -11 & 12 (Oct. 1, 1996). Moreover, Utah law does not allow 
6
 Mr. McCoy acknowledged that the existence of other insurance could be 
relevant to the amount Blue Cross might have to pay but not to its obligation to pay 
something. (R. 131.) In fact, the McCoys had other health insurance through Mr. McCoy's 
employer. Although that insurer initially denied coverage for Mrs. McCoy's treatment as 
well, it later reversed its decision. The McCoys were pursuing coverage under both policies 
simultaneously. By the time the McCoys received a final denial from Blue Cross, Mrs. 
McCoy had received HDCT/PSCR through the McCoys9 other health insurance, but Blue 
Cross's baseless denials of coverage had needlessly delayed her treatment in a situation 
where time was critical to Mrs. McCoy's chances of survival. 
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piecemeal denials of a claim but requires the insured to communicate any basis for the denial 
of the claim promptly and in writing to the claimant. Id. R590-89-12.B. 
Mr. Pignanelli's letter concluded: "If you remain dissatisfied with this decision, you 
have the right to seek binding arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. The Customer Service Department can assist you with information 
about how to initiate and participate in arbitration." (R. 133.) This was the first time Mr. 
McCoy learned that arbitration was a means of resolving his dispute with Blue Cross. (R. 
83-84, fflf 20-21.)7 Mr. McCoy understood from Mr. Pignanelli's letter that arbitration was 
an option he was entitled to, but he did not understand that it was his only option. (R. 83-84, 
%20.) 
On March 2, 1995, Mrs. McCoy died from complications from breast cancer. (R. 85, 
If 28.) 
Mr. McCoy later filed this action against Blue Cross alleging claims for, among other 
things, breach of express contract, breach of Blue Cross's implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, negligence, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent and 
negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages. (R. 2-13.) 
7
 Mr. McCoy had previously received Explanation of Claims Processed forms 
from Blue Cross, which stated that he had "the right" to arbitration. (R. 84, % 22, & 135-36.) 
Mr. McCoy did not recall reading this language before but testified that, if he had, he would 
not have understood from the language that binding arbitration was his only option or that 
he was precluded from bringing a court action against Blue Cross. (R. 84, % 23.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Before a party can be compelled to arbitrate a dispute, he first must have agreed to 
arbitrate it, and Mr. McCoy never agreed to arbitrate his claims against Blue Cross. It is 
undisputed that the policy in effect when Mr. McCoy enrolled in the Qualifier I plan did not 
require arbitration. Blue Cross claims that it later amended the contract to include a binding 
arbitration provision, but the McCoys never received the endorsement adding the provision, 
nor did they receive a copy of the amended plan before Mr. McCoy brought this action. 
(Point LA.) 
Blue Cross argues that the McCoys did not have to receive the endorsement—it just 
had to mail it to them. Even assuming that were the case, Blue Cross did not meet its burden 
ofproving that it effectively amended the contract to require arbitration. (Point LB.) It did 
not present any direct evidence that a letter to Mr. McCoy was actually printed, inserted in 
an envelope addressed to Mr. McCoy and presented for mailing (point LB. 1), nor did Blue 
Cross show that notice of the proposed modification of the contract was sent to Mr. McCoy 
by first-class mail, as required by the contract (point LB.2). Blue Cross also failed to show 
that it complied with the applicable statutes and rules governing its purported modification 
of the contract. (Point LB.3.) In any event, the mere mailing of a notice that is never 
received is insufficient to establish an agreement to arbitrate. The statute requires an actual 
agreement to arbitrate, not constructive notice of a unilateral change in a contract to require 
binding arbitration. Blue Cross cannot bootstrap a so-called agreement that notice is 
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effective on mailing into an agreement to arbitrate where the insured never received notice 
of the proposed change. (Point I.B.4.) 
Blue Cross argues that even if Mr. McCoy did not agree to an arbitration provision 
he knew nothing about, he effectively agreed to arbitrate his disputes when he failed to 
cancel the policy after he learned of the provision. But Mr. McCoy did not see the provision 
until after he filed this action. Although he knew that he had a "right" to arbitration before, 
he did not know that arbitration was his only option. Mr. McCoy did not even learn of his 
right to arbitrate until after his wife was diagnosed with breast cancer. He could not have 
canceled the policy at that time without losing coverage. Therefore, his failure to cancel the 
policy cannot preclude him from bringing this action. (Point I.C.) 
If the trial court erred in finding that there was no agreement to arbitrate, this court 
should remand the case for the trial court to consider Mr. McCoy's other arguments as to 
why the arbitration agreement is unenforceable. (Point H) 
Finally, the asserted presumption in favor of arbitration should not apply in this case 
as a matter of public policy. A health insurer should not be able to unilaterally change an 
adhesion contract to require binding arbitration, thus depriving an insured of his or her 
constitutional right to go to court, and thereby insulate its policies and practices from 




MR. McCOY NEVER AGREED TO ARBITRATE 
HIS CLAIMS AGAINST BLUE CROSS. 
Before a party can be compelled to arbitrate a dispute, he first must have agreed to 
arbitrate it. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 
(1986); Worthington & Kimball Constr. Co. v. C&A Dev. Co., Ill P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 
1989). The Utah Arbitration Act states: 
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised 
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the 
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and 
order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-4(l) (1996) (emphasis added).8 The trial court in effect 
concluded that Blue Cross had not met its burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate. The 
trial court's conclusion was correct, under whatever standard it is reviewed. This court 
should therefore affirm the trial court's order denying Blue Cross's motion to compel 
arbitration. 
8
 The Utah Supreme Court has recently construed section 78-3 la-4 and section 
78-3 la-3, which makes a ''written agreement5' to submit a controversy to arbitration valid and 
enforceable, as requiring arbitration agreements to be in writing to be enforceable. Jenkins 
v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). 
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A. Mr. McCoy Did Not Agree to Arbitrate His Claims Because He Did Not Know 
About the Arbitration Provision Blue Cross Relies On. 
It is undisputed that the insurance policy Mr. McCoy signed up for and received did 
not include an arbitration provision. Blue Cross claims that it later amended the contract to 
include a binding arbitration provision, but Mr. McCoy did not agree to arbitrate his claims 
because he never knew about-much less agreed to-the purported modification of the 
contract until he brought this action. (See R. 266, f^ 4.)9 
9
 In his first affidavit, filed in opposition to Blue Cross's motion to compel 
arbitration, Mr. McCoy stated that he "never received notice of the arbitration requirement 
that Blue Cross alleges was added to the policy . . . until some time in January 1995." (R. 
81, Tf 10.) In his supplemental affidavit, Mr. McCoy clarified that statement. In January 
1995 Mr. McCoy received a letter from Mr. Pignanelli, general counsel for Blue Cross, 
denying his appeal and stating that if Mr. McCoy was not satisfied with his decision, he had 
"the right to seek binding arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association." (R. 133.) Mr. McCoy understood from Mr. Pignanelli's letter that 
he had the right to arbitrate his dispute, not that he was required to arbitrate his dispute. (R. 
83-84, % 20; 266, If 3.) Mr. McCoy further stated, "I did not receive a copy of the arbitration 
provision that Blue Cross relies on in January 1995 or at any other time before I brought this 
action." (R. 266,14.) Blue Cross did not challenge Mr. McCoy's supplemental affidavit. 
Instead, it submitted an affidavit from Mr. Pignanelli. Mr. Pignanelli agreed that he sent the 
letter to Mr. McCoy, stated that a "true and correct copy" of the letter was attached to his 
affidavit, and said that, "[b]ased upon my review of my McCoy file, I conclude that I 
enclosed a copy of the Type 57J health care agreement and the appropriate endorsements 
with that letter." (R. 262, fflf 6-7.) No letter is attached to Mr. Pignanelli's affidavit, much 
less any enclosure. (See R. 261-64.) The letter Mr. McCoy received stated, "I would refer 
you to the language contained in the Endorsement that was attached to your health care 
agreement, a copy of which is enclosed." (R. 132.) This language is ambiguous as to 
whether the endorsement was enclosed or the agreement was enclosed. Mr. McCoy received 
a copy of the referenced endorsement with Mr. Pignanelli's letter. (See R. 83, ^  20; 132-34.) 
That endorsement dealt with bone marrow transplants; it said nothing about arbitration. (See 
R. 134.) Mr. McCoy did not receive a copy of the policy with Mr. Pignanelli's letter. (See 
R. 132-34; 266, % 4.) 
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Utah courts have consistently refused to enforce provisions of insurance contracts 
where, as here, the insured did not receive notice of the existence and import of the 
provision. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d231, 236-37 (Utah 1985); General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1983); Moore v. Energy 
Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 1144-46 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Neither the policy nor the 
brochure Mr. McCoy received when he enrolled in the Qualifier I plan said that he had to 
arbitrate any dispute with Blue Cross; instead, they allowed him to seek redress of his rights 
in court. Because Mr. McCoy did not receive notice of any change in his policy to require 
arbitration-much less agreed to any such change-the trial court properly concluded that he 
could not be compelled to arbitrate his claims against Blue Cross. 
B, Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That It Effectively Amended Its 
Policy to Require Arbitration of Mr. McCoy's Claims. 
Blue Cross argues that Mr. McCoy agreed to a provision he never knew about because 
he is conclusively deemed to have agreed to changes in his policy if Blue Cross mailed the 
change to him, regardless of whether he ever received it, and Blue Cross mailed the 
endorsement purporting to add an arbitration provision to Mr. McCoy. 
There are several problems with this argument. First, Blue Cross did not meet its 
burden of showing that it mailed the endorsement to Mr. McCoy. Second, Blue Cross did 
not meet its burden of proving that it complied with the notice requirements of the contract, 
on which it relies. Third, Blue Cross did not meet its burden of proving that its purported 
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change in the contract complied with governing statutes and rules. Fourth, even assuming 
that Blue Cross proved that the proposed arbitration provision was mailed, as a matter of law 
mere mailing is not enough to establish a binding, enforceable agreement to arbitrate. 
1. Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That It Mailed the 
Arbitration Endorsement to Mr. McCoy. 
In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Blue Cross submitted the Affidavit of 
Edwina H. Green. (See R. 30.) When the trial court invited the parties to submit 
supplemental memoranda, Blue Cross submitted a supplemental affidavit from Ms. Green 
(R. 242) and affidavits from Gary C. Warner of Image Printing (R. 237),10 Gary Nelsen of 
Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (R. 249) and Mr. Pignanelli of Blue Cross (R. 261).11 
These affidavits, taken together, show that sometime around November 11, 1985, Blue Cross 
prepared a tape of all subscribers who were supposed to receive the endorsement purporting 
to add the arbitration provision to the contract and forwarded the tape to Image Printing, 
which printed a cover letter to go with the endorsement, inserting the subscriber's name and 
address on Blue Cross letterhead. The letters and endorsements were then forwarded to 
Progressive Direct Mail Advertising for mailing. (See R. 31, 1f 4; 238-39; 243-44.) 
10
 Mr. Warner's affidavit is titled, indexed in the record and referred to in Blue 
Cross's brief as the "Affidavit of Keith Stoddard." However, it starts out "I, Gary C. 
Warner" (R. 238), and is signed by Mr. Warner (R. 239). Presumably, it is Mr. Warner's 
affidavit and not Mr. Stoddard's. 
11
 Mr. Pignanelli's affidavit went only to the question of Mr. McCoy's alleged 
acceptance of the arbitration provision after he learned of it, discussed in pt. I.C, infra. 
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According to Ms. Green, Mr. McCoy's name "would have" been on the tape because the 
letter and endorsement were to go to everyone insured under a Qualifier I - Type 57H policy, 
and Mr. McCoy was insured under such a policy as of October 16, 1985. (See R. 31-32 & 
244, ^  8.) However, Ms. Green could not say for sure that Mr. McCoy's name and address 
were actually on the tape (see R. 278-79, f 4), and Blue Cross did not produce a copy of the 
tape. 
Blue Cross criticizes the trial court's finding that Blue Cross relied "solely on the 
affidavit of Ms. Green as evidence that [it] mailed an arbitration amendment to Mr. McCoy" 
(R. 277, If 6). (See Br. of Appellant at 16-17.) Although Blue Cross also submitted 
affidavits from the printer (Mr. Warner) and the mailer (Mr. Nelsen), those affidavits merely 
set out the procedures those companies would have followed in the fall of 1985. (See R. 
238-39, 250-52.) Neither one could say what names were included on the tape that Blue 
Cross prepared, what names were printed on the letters or to whom the letters were sent. Ms. 
Green was the only one who even purported to tie Mr. McCoy to the mailing, and the most 
she could say was that Mr. McCoy's name should have been included on the tape.12 None 
of the affiants could say for sure that Mr. McCoy's name and address were actually on the 
tape, that a letter was actually printed addressed to Mr. McCoy, that the letter and 
12
 According to Ms. Green, Mr. McCoy's name should have been included on the 
subscriber tape because the tape was meant to include all subscribers under two different 
plans-the 57H nongroup plan and the IGE group plan-and Mr. McCoy had been a member 
of the IGE plan from October 1, 1985, until "[approximately one week later," when Mr. 
McCoy's insurance was converted to a 57H nongroup contract. (R. 244.) Ms. Green could 
not say, however, under which plan Mr. McCoy was included on the tape. (See R. 244.) 
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endorsement were inserted into an envelope and that they were actually mailed to Mr. 
McCoy. 
These omissions are important because this court has held that, before an inference 
can arise that a particular letter was actually mailed, there must be "direct evidence" that the 
letter was actually prepared, that is, that the particular document in question was written, 
signed, addressed and placed in the regular place of mailing. Ulster v. Utah Valley 
Community College, 881 P.2d 933, 940-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 
(Utah 1995). 
In Litster, the plaintiff (Litster) sued Utah Valley Community College, a governmental 
entity. The college moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Litster had not 
complied with the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which required 
that he file a notice of claim with the Attorney General within one year of his injury. A 
secretary in the Attorney General's office submitted an affidavit stating that the Attorney 
General had never received a notice of claim from Litster. Litster's attorney submitted an 
affidavit stating that it was his "official office procedure" to send a notice of claim to the 
Attorney General in such cases, that he had sent a notice of claim to the college (which was 
not disputed) and had given "handwritten direction" to his secretary to also sent a copy of 
the notice to the Attorney General, and that it was the policy of his office that, "when 
direction is given to send notices, that direction is followed." Id. at 935. The attorney also 
submitted a supplemental affidavit, in which he stated that it was the practice of his secretary 
to comply with instructions on the day or the day after she received them, that he instructed 
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her on a certain date to mail notice of the claim to the Attorney General's office, that it was 
her practice to take the notice and place it in an envelope with postage prepaid and deposit 
it in a post office box in their building, from which the postal service picked up the mail at 
a certain time each evening. The attorney also stated, "It is my understanding and my belief 
that the practice of my office was followed in the present case and that in fact notice was 
copied, placed in a postage prepaid envelope, addressed to the Utah State Attorney General's 
Office, and mailed on November 25 or November 26, 1991." Id at 936. The court found 
this evidence insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the required 
notice was given. Id at 942. 
The court noted that, while an inference of mailing can arise from evidence of an 
office mailing custom, there first must be "direct evidence" that the document in question 
was actually prepared. Id at 940-41. The affidavits of Litster's attorney failed to provide 
direct evidence that the notice of claim allegedly mailed to the Attorney General was ever 
prepared. The attorney did not say that he dictated a letter addressed to the Attorney 
General, signed it or gave it to his secretary, nor did the secretary say that she actually typed 
a notice addressed to the Attorney General or made a photocopy of the notice that was sent 
to the college and placed it in an envelope addressed to the Attorney General. Id at 941. 
The most the affidavits established was that a letter addressed to the Attorney General should 
have been prepared and mailed, in the regular course of the attorney's business. This was 
insufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the required notice was actually 
mailed. 
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Similarly, in this case, the most Blue Cross's affidavits established was that a letter 
addressed to Mr. McCoy should have been prepared, but there was no direct evidence that 
such a letter was actually prepared, that is, that a letter actually addressed to Mr. McCoy was 
printed, placed in an envelope and placed in the regular place for mailing. This was 
insufficient to meet Blue Cross's burden of showing that it actually mailed notice to Mr. 
McCoy. See id. at 940-42. See also Bennett Motor Co. v. Lyon, 14 Utah 2d 161, 380 P.2d 
69, 71 (1963) (an insurer's evidence fell short of proving that it mailed a notice of 
cancellation to the insured where it consisted of testimony regarding the business routine and 
practice of its agent in preparing and mailing such notices but "it was not shown that such 
routine or practice had been followed with regard to the instant alleged notice"). Cf Shafer 
v. A.I.T.S., Inc., 428 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (the purported sender failed to 
establish the "threshold requirement" of showing that a letter was actually prepared where 
it merely showed that the name of the purported recipient was on a tape and that "this tape 
ran all the way through") (cited with approval in Litster). 
Blue Cross relies on Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 851 P.2d 
647 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993), for its argument that it 
provided sufficient evidence to prove it mailed the arbitration endorsement to the McCoys. 
That case, however, is distinguishable because the undisputed facts in that case showed not 
only that the insurer followed its normal business procedure in preparing cancellation 
notices, but also that it had actually prepared and addressed a cancellation notice to the 
plaintiff insured, addressed to "Hauns Baumgart / DBA-H.P.B. / 2469 East 7000 South #200 
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/ Salt Lake City, UT 84121." See 851 P.2d at 650, 652. It was also undisputed that the 
insurer prepared a mailing certificate showing that notice to the plaintiff was mailed. 
Moreover, the insurer produced a copy of Postal Service Form 3877, which it used to record 
addresses to which it sent certified mail, and this form indicated that the United States Postal 
Service had received from the insurer a notice of cancellation form mailed to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 650. Thus, there was direct evidence that a notice to the plaintiff was actually 
prepared, addressed and delivered to the Postal Service. Here, there was no direct evidence 
that a letter addressed to Mr. McCoy was actually prepared and deposited in the mail, only 
that one should have been prepared and mailed in the usual course of the businesses of Blue 
Cross, Image Printing and Progressive Direct Mail Advertising. Under the holdings of 
Litster, Bennett and Shafer, that is not enough to meet Blue Cross's burden of proving that 
the notice was mailed.13 
13
 Even where a letter is prepared, proof of office custom may not be enough to 
establish that the letter was actually mailed where the letter was never received. While some 
courts hold that evidence of office custom alone is enough to raise an inference or even a 
presumption that a particular mailing took place, others require corroborating evidence. See 
Litster, 881 P.2d at 941-42 n.7. Moreover, failure to receive an article through the mail 
raises a presumption that it was not mailed. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Maes, 235 
F.2d 918, 921 (10th Cir. 1956). In any event, any presumption such evidence creates is 
rebuttable, and some courts have held that sworn testimony that a letter was never received 
can rebut a presumption of receipt. See, e.g., Witt v. Roadway Express, 136F.3d 1424, 1430 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 188 (1998); Diamond T. Utah, Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co., 12 
Utah 2d 37, 361 P.2d 665, 667 (1961). Mr. McCoy testified under oath that he never 
received the alleged mailing. {See R. 266, f 4.) Thus, Blue Cross is wrong when it says that 
"the evidence regarding mailing was unrebutted." (Br. of Appellant at 17; see also id. at 20.) 
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Blue Cross's evidence was also deficient in another respect. The evidence Blue Cross 
relies on to show that Mr. McCoy was sent the endorsement shows that seventy of the letters 
Blue Cross purports to have mailed were not mailed. Blue Cross delivered a tape with 
subscribers' names and addresses to Image Printing. (R. 31, Tf 4.) From the tape, Image 
Printing printed and charged Blue Cross for 30,426 letters addressed to Blue Cross 
policyholders. (See R. 238-39, 248.) However, Image only delivered 30,356 letters to 
Progressive for mailing, and Progressive only mailed 30,356 letters. (R. 245, ffif 13-14; 248.) 
From this evidence and the fact that the McCoys never received the letter and endorsement, 
the trial court could reasonably conclude that Blue Cross did not meet its burden of 
establishing that it ever mailed notice of the arbitration provision to Mr. McCoy.14 
2. Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That It Complied with the 
Contract Requirements for Notice. 
Even if Blue Cross had proved that it mailed the arbitration endorsement to Mr. 
McCoy, that would not be sufficient to amend his policy to require arbitration. For a mailing 
to be effective under the policy, the mailing must comply with the terms of the policy. 
14
 Blue Cross's evidence that it mailed the amended policies to Mr. McCoy was 
even more deficient. Ms. Green merely stated that, as the holder of a Qualifier I - Type 57H 
policy, Mr. McCoy "would have received all reprints and additions of the health care 
agreement. . . sent by Blue Cross . . . at various times." (R. 32, f 7.) Ms. Green does not 
identify the "reprints and additions" that would have been sent to the McCoys, does not say 
how they would have been sent or when they would have been sent and does not say 
specifically that they were sent to Mr. McCoy, much less that they were properly addressed 
and mailed to him by first-class mail on a specific date. 
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Mr. McCoy's policy defined the "Agreement" as "this document and attached riders 
when duly issued by the Plan" (as well as certain other documents not relevant here). (R. 
102 (emphasis added).) The endorsement Blue Cross relies on was never "attached" to Mr. 
McCoy's policy. Thus, it did not become a part of his agreement. 
The policy further provided: 
MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT 
The Plan shall at all times have the absolute right to modify or amend this 
Agreement from time to time; provided, however, that no such modification 
or amendment shall be effective until thirty (SO) days after written notice 
thereof has been given to the Subscriber. 
(R. 109 (emphasis added).) Under Utah law, the language of an insurance policy must be 
construed as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would understand it, United States Fidelity 
& Guar. Co. v. Sandu 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993), and an ordinary purchaser of 
insurance could reasonably understand this language to require actual notice to the insured 
before Blue Cross could change the policy. 
However, a later provision in the policy states: 
Any notice to the Subscriber provided for in this Agreement shall be deemed 
to have been given to and received by the Subscriber when deposited in the 
United States Mail with first class postage prepaid and addressed to the 
Subscriber at the address shown in the records of the Plan. Any notice to the 
Plan provided for in this Agreement may be given by mail addressed to Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, P.O. Box 30270, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130; 
provided, however, that any notice to the Plan shall not be deemed to have 
been given to and received by the Plan until physically received by the Plan. 
(R. 112 (emphasis added).) In other words, notice to the insured is effective on mailing, but 
notice to Blue Cross must be actually received. 
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Assuming that such a one-sided provision in an adhesion contract is not 
unconscionable and could be enforced, cf. Smith v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 313 N.E.2d 21, 23-
25 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1973) (a clause providing that mailing notice is sufficient proof of notice 
was void as against public policy), Blue Cross failed to meet its burden of showing that it 
complied with the policy provision for notice. Nowhere in any of the affidavits that Blue 
Cross submitted does it say that the notice Blue Cross purportedly mailed to the McCoys was 
sent by first class mail. (See R. 30-32, 237-40, 242-46, 249-52.) Thus, even if Blue Cross 
could establish an agreement to arbitrate merely by showing that it gave notice under the 
contract of its unilateral modification of the contract to add an arbitration provision, Blue 
Cross's proof fails because it has not shown that it complied with the contractual 
requirements for notice. 
Blue Cross relies on Diamond T. Utah Inc. v. Canal Insurance Company, 12 Utah 
2d 37, 361 P.2d 665 (1961), for its argument that mailing is sufficient to change the contract. 
Diamond T. is dispositive of Blue Cross's argument, but not in the way Blue Cross thinks. 
In that case, the insured sought coverage for a loss under its policy. The insurer showed that 
its agent had prepared a notice of cancellation and mailed it to the insured before the loss 
occurred. The trial court found that the notice had been mailed but nevertheless found that 
the policy was in effect at the time of the loss, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. 
The policy at issue required the mailing of "written notice stating when not less than 
ten days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing of notice as aforesaid 
shall be sufficient proof of notice." Quotedin 361 P.2d at 667 (emphasis added). Thecourt 
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noted that the majority of decisions that had considered such policy provisions had held that 
actual receipt of a cancellation notice by the insured "is not a condition precedent to the 
cancellation of the insurance by the insurer, provided the cancellation notice itself contains 
a fixed date on which the cancellation is to become effective." Id. (footnote omitted).15 The 
court further noted: "The rationale of these decisions is that the express terms of the contract 
uphold the sufficiency of a notice deposited in the mail, and that such provision, being 
unambiguous, must be enforced as written." 361 P.2d at 667. 
The insurer in Diamond T. sent a notice of cancellation that stated: "THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CANCELLATION SHALL BE FIVE (5) DAYS AFTER SERVICE 
OF THIS NOTICE." Quoted in id The court held that the notice that was mailed "did not 
comply with the provisions of the cancellation clause." Id. "The notice did not fix a date 
certain upon which the cancellation was to be effective but instead provided for a time to 
become fixed by the happening of a future event, namely the service of the notice upon the 
insured " Id. Because the insurer had not "strictly complied with the policy provisions, 
the mere mailing of the notice was not sufficient proof of notice." Id.16 
15
 The court further noted that "there is probably a presumption that mail properly 
addressed and deposited is received," 361 P.2d at 667 (emphasis added), but found that the 
presumption had been overcome by the testimony of two of the purported recipients that they 
had not received the notice. Id. 
16
 The court in Diamond T. also held a reinsurer liable under the terms of its 
reinsurance contract even though the reinsurer had sent-and the insurer acknowledged 
receiving—a "General Change Endorsement" arguably terminating the reinsurance certificate. 
The court noted that, under the terms of the reinsurance certificate's cancellation clause, 
cancellation could be effected by ten days' written notice stating the effective date of the 
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Here, the burden was on Blue Cross to show that it "strictly complied with the policy 
provisions" regarding the mailing of notice. Cf. 361 P.2d at 667. It failed to do so because 
it failed to prove that the notice to Mr. McCoy was "deposited in the United States Mail with 
first class postage prepaid and addressed to the Subscriber at the address shown in the 
records of the Plan." (See R. 112.) Therefore, the trial court's order should be affirmed. 
3. Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That Its Purported 
Modification of the Policy Complied with the Governing Statutes and 
Rules. 
Before Blue Cross could amend Mr. McCoy's policy to require arbitration, it had to 
comply not only with the terms of its own policy, but it also had to comply with applicable 
statutes and rules. 
At the time Blue Cross purported to amend Mr. McCoy's policy, the Utah Insurance 
Code provided that no nonprofit health service corporation, such as Blue Cross, "shall 
deliver or issue for delivery in this state any . . . endorsement. . . until a copy of the form 
. . . has been filed with approval by the commissioner." UTAH CODE ANN. § 3 l-37-16(l)(a) 
(Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).17 The statute further provided: "At the expiration of fifteen 
days the form so filed shall be deemed approved unless prior thereto it has been affirmatively 
cancellation. The endorsement did not give ten days' notice and was therefore ineffective. 
See361P.2dat668. 
17
 The current Insurance Code, title 31A of the Utah Code, was enacted in 
February 1985 but did not become effective until July 1, 1986. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 242, 
§59. 
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approved or disapproved by order of the commissioner." Id. § 3 l-37-16(l)(b). Finally, the 
statute stated: "No form shall be issued, delivered, or used to which the commissioner's 
approval does not exist" Id § 31-37-16(l)(d). 
The evidence Blue Cross submitted in support of its motion showed that Blue Cross 
sent the tape containing subscribers' names to Image Printing on or about November 14, 
1985. (R. 244, | 10.) Image forwarded the printed letters to Progressive Direct Mail 
Advertising, and Progressive completed the mailing on November 25, 1985. (R. 245,113.) 
Blue Cross filed the proposed endorsement with Utah's insurance commission on or about 
November 22, 1985. (R. 245, f 16.) However, Blue Cross submitted no evidence that the 
insurance commissioner approved the endorsement before it was delivered or "issue[d] for 
delivery" to subscribers. The endorsement would have been deemed approved "[a]t the 
expiration of fifteen days" after the form was filed, but that would have been December 7, 
1985—well after the endorsement was supposedly mailed to Mr. McCoy.18 Thus, under the 
terms of the governing statute, the purported modification of the contract to require 
arbitration was ineffective. 
18
 Not only was December 7 too late for approval under the terms of the statute, 
but it was also too late under the terms of the contract. The policy required thirty days' 
advance written notice of any change to the policy. {See R. 109.) The endorsement was 
supposed to become effective on January 1, 1986. Therefore, it had to have been approved 
and mailed by December 1, 1985. {See R. 31, lj 3.) 
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Moreover, any later attempts by Blue Cross to modify the policy to require binding 
arbitration were also ineffective.19 
In 1987, the new Insurance Code was amended to allow for "permissible arbitration 
provisions" in insurance contracts. See 1987 Utah Laws ch. 95, § 27 (codified at UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-21-314(2)). However, the statute did not define "permissible arbitration 
provisions" but left it up to the Insurance Commissioner to do so. In 1988 the Insurance 
Commissioner promulgated a regulation providing that "[b]oth compulsory and optional 
binding arbitration at the election of either the insured or the insurer are 'permissible 
arbitration provisions,'" UTAH ADMIN CODE R540-122-4.3 (1989) (renumbered R590-122-
4.3).20 but before an insurer can make binding arbitration a part of the contract of insurance, 
it has to include in the application or binder for the insurance "a prominent statement 
substantially as follows": 
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND THE 
COMPANY MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO COURT ACTION PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF 
(THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION OR OTHER 
RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR), A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE ON 
19
 The "actual complete contract containing the arbitration provision" was not 
filed with the insurance commission until August 10, 1989. (R. 245, ^  17.) It is not clear 
from the record which contract this was. In any event, any modification of the contract after 
July 1, 1986, would have had to comply with the new Insurance Code, and there is no 
evidence that Blue Cross met all the requirements of the new Insurance Code for modifying 
the policy. 
20
 This rule replaced Utah State Insurance Department Bulletin 87-2 (a copy of 
which is included in the addendum), which prohibited mandatory binding arbitration 
provisions in insurance contracts. 
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REQUEST FROM THE COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED BY 
ARBITRATION SHALL BE BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE 
COMPANY. THE ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IF ALLOWED BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE 
ENTERED AS A JUDGEMENT IN ANY COURT OF PROPER 
JURISDICTION. 
Id R540-122-4.5 (renumbered R590-122-4.5). The regulation further requires that such a 
statement be disclosed "prior to the execution of the insurance contract between the insurer 
and the policy holder." Id. Blue Cross never provided Mr. McCoy with the required 
statement and certainly not before execution of the policy; therefore, Blue Cross cannot 
enforce the arbitration provision of the policy. 
Moreover, the new Insurance Code provided that, subject to certain exceptions that 
do not apply here, "no purported modification of a contract during the term of the policy 
affects the obligations of a party to the contract unless the modification is in writing and 
agreed to by the party against whose interest the modification operates." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 31A-21-106(2) (1994) (emphasis added).21 
21
 Even in the absence of a statute, one party to a contract cannot unilaterally 
modify the contract. The parties may agree to modify the contract, but any modification 
requires the assent of each party and new consideration. See, e.g., Wright v. Johnson, 610 
P.2d 567, 570 (Idaho 1980); National Interstate Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 630 P.2d 779, 783 
(Okla. 1981); Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980); 
Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979); Fisher v. Fisher, 907 
P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Wash. 
1980). Cf. Massey v. Farmers Ins. Group, 837 P.2d 880, 884 (Okla. 1992) (one party to a 
contract may not unilaterally decide to have someone other than a jury determine issues in 
controversy, thereby destroying the other party's right to a jury trial) (citation omitted). 
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Any purported modification of the contract in this case to require binding arbitration 
of all disputes concerning the contract clearly operated against Mr. McCoy's interest, since, 
without the modification, Mr. McCoy would have had a constitutional right to have his 
dispute with Blue Cross decided in a court of law, before a jury of his peers. See, e.g., 
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799-800 (Utah 1998); Bamhart v. Civil Serv. Employees 
Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873, 876 (1965). Parties who submit their claims to 
arbitration "(1) give up their constitutional right to redress in the courts, (2) waive procedural 
safeguards, including the rules of evidence and the rules of civil procedure, and (3) severely 
limit their right of appeal. Thus,.. . arbitration strips participants of significant legal rights 
. . . ." Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 803 (Russon, J., dissenting).22 Therefore, any purported 
modification of the contract to add an arbitration provision required Mr. McCoy's agreement 
to be effective.23 Mr. McCoy never received the proposed modification to the contract until 
22
 In Jenkins the court held that, because of the significant constitutional rights 
a party gives up by agreeing to arbitrate, an arbitration agreement must be in writing to be 
enforceable. See 962 P.2d at 799-800. On this point, the majority and dissent agreed. The 
dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that, under some circumstances, an oral 
agreement to arbitrate could be enforced under the equitable doctrine of part performance. 
See id. at 802 (Russon, J., dissenting). 
23
 Blue Cross does not dispute that its purported modification of the contract to 
require binding arbitration operated against Mr. McCoy's interests. It suggests, however, 
that the arbitration provision was not a "less favorable" term of the contract under another 
provision of the Insurance Code, UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994). That 
provision states: 
[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the policy, but on less favorable 
terms or at higher rates, the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date 
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to the policyholder notice of 
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he brought this action and never knew about it until after his claims arose, much less agreed 
to it. Consequently, any purported modification of the contract to add a binding arbitration 
provision after the new Insurance Code took effect (July 1, 1986) was not effective. 
Blue Cross argues that section 31A-21-106(2) does not apply because the statute only 
requires the insured's agreement if the policy is modified "during the term of the policy" and 
the policy was not modified during its "term." According to Blue Cross, premiums on Mr. 
McCoy's policy were due each quarter, and the modification was made effective at the end 
of a quarter and thus not during the policy's "term." (See Br. of Appellant at 24.) The fact 
that premiums may have been due each quarter, however, does not mean that the "term" of 
the policy was just three months. The policy expressly provided: "The term of this 
Agreement shall be for a period commencing on the Effective Date and continuing until this 
Agreement is terminated as herein provided." (R. 108.) The policy then provided for 
termination on the occurrence of certain events, such as nonpayment of dues, fraud or 
misrepresentation by the insured, divorce, and the giving of thirty-days' written notice of 
the new terms or rates at least 30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior 
policy. If the insurer did not give this prior notification to the policyholder, 
the new terms or rates do not take effect until 30 days after the notice is 
delivered or sent by first class mail, in which case the policyholder may elect 
to cancel the renewal policy at any time during the 30-day period.... 
(Emphasis added.) This provision does not apply because the term of the policy never 
expired; consequently, the policy was never "renew[ed]." See infra Moreover, Blue Cross 
failed to prove when it sent any notice of new terms to Mr. McCoy after the effective date 
of the statute and failed to prove that any such notices were sent by first-class mail, as 
required by the statute. (See supra, notes 12.) In any event, a policy provision that requires 
a party to give up constitutional rights is clearly a "less favorable" term. 
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termination by either side. (See R. 108-09.) None of those events occurred in this case 
before this action was filed. Thus, the original term of the plan had not expired, and the 
policy had not been effectively modified when Mr. McCoy's claims arose. 
4. Mailing Notice of a Proposed Arbitration Provision Is Not Sufficient to 
Establish an "Agreement" to Arbitrate. 
Even if Blue Cross had proved that it mailed to Mr. McCoy the endorsement 
purporting to add an arbitration provision to the contract (and it did not), that would not have 
been sufficient to meet Blue Cross's burden. 
Before a party can be compelled to arbitrate, the intent of the parties to make 
arbitration their exclusive remedy must be clear. "Parties are not to be led into arbitration 
through subtlety." Ben-Reuven v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 526 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (Sup. Ct. 
1988). The Utah Arbitration Act requires a written "arbitration agreement.'' UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-31a-4(l). See also Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). An 
"agreement" (contained in the boilerplate of an adhesion contract) to some constructive or 
substitute notice procedure for amending an insurance policy cannot substitute for the written 
"agreement" to arbitrate that the Arbitration Act requires. One cannot "agree" to a provision 
one does not even know about. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently held that even the public policy supporting the 
speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes cannot outweigh a person's constitutional right 
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of access to the courts under article I, sections 7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution24 unless the 
person waives that right. Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 800. Not only must any such waiver be in 
writing, but it must also be "clear," id, "voluntary, intelligent, and knowing" id at 799. 
Accord Barnhart, 398 P.2d at 877 (1965).25 This is consistent with constitutional 
requirements: "[A] waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be 
clear." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972). Courts "do not presume acquiescence in 
the loss of fundamental rights." Ohio Bell Tel Co. v. Public Utilities Comm 'n of Ohio, 301 
U.S. 292, 307 (1937). 
One cannot knowingly and intelligently waive a right without knowing he is doing so, 
yet that is what Blue Cross's argument amounts to. An "agreement" to accept constructive 
notice of a change in a policy cannot substitute for a clear, knowing and intelligent waiver 
of one's constitutional right of access to the courts. Blue Cross should not be able to 
bootstrap an "agreement" that notices provided for in the policy could be mailed to the 
24
 Article I, section 7 states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." Section 11 states, in relevant part: "All courts shall 
be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay 
25
 The Draft Final Report of the Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution 
established by the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association and the 
American Medical Association, issued July 27, 1998, established a "Due Process Protocol 
for Resolution of Health Care Disputes," including disputes over health plan coverage. 
Principle 3 of the Due Process Protocol provides: "The agreement to use ADR [Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, such as arbitration] should be knowing and voluntary." (The Draft Final 
Report is available on the Internet at www.adr.org/hcdrc_final_report.html.) 
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insured into an "agreemenf' to changes that the insured never knew of, particularly when his 
constitutional rights are at stake. Blue Cross was required to show a clear, knowing and 
intelligent written agreement waiving Mr. McCoy's constitutional right of access to the 
courts. A constructive notice provision in an adhesion contract that does not mention 
arbitration does not satisfy that requirement. Cf Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 
119 F.3d 756, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1997) (a knowing waiver does not occur where the plaintiff 
does not know about the arbitration provision and is not expressly put on notice that he is 
giving up his right of access to the courts), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1511 (1998). 
This case is similar to McGreevy v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Company, 876 P.2d 
463 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), affd on other grounds, 904 P.2d 731 (Wash. 1995). The 
plaintiff in that case sought to stack uninsured motorist coverage limits for several 
automobiles. The insurer denied stacking, relying in part on an endorsement to the policy 
that it claimed it had sent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied ever having received the 
endorsement. A jury returned a special verdict finding that the insurer had not mailed the 
endorsement to Ms. McGreevy. On appeal, the insurer argued, first, that the endorsement 
was effective regardless of whether the insured actually received it. The court rejected the 
argument: 
Following the issuance of the policy here, Oregon Mutual [the insurer] 
attempted to unilaterally amend it to take advantage of changes in the law 
which authorized the prohibition of stacking. But this required a change in the 
contract of insurance which, in turn, required a meeting of the minds and 
agreement. Notice and agreement must be obtained before amendments or 
modifications to insurance policies can be made by the insurer 
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876 P.2d at 469 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
The court also rejected the argument that a reference to the endorsement on the 
bottom of a declarations page the insured periodically received was sufficient to notify the 
insured of the purported change in the policy. The court noted, "Without receipt of the 
actual endorsement, which the jury concluded [the plaintiff] did not receive, the notation 
would not have been meaningful." Id Similarly, the reference to arbitration on the 
Explanation of Claims Processed forms that Mr. McCoy periodically received was not 
sufficient to put Mr. McCoy on notice that he had lost his right to litigate any claim in a court 
of law, particularly where it only said that he had the "right" to arbitrate, not that he was 
required to arbitrate or that he had lost his right to seek redress in court. (See infra, pt. LC.) 
The court also rejected the insurer's argument that an increase in premiums should 
have put the insured on notice that a change had been made to her policy. 876 P.2d at 470. 
Here, there was no change in the premiums Blue Cross charged Mr. McCoy, despite Blue 
Cross's representation that the modification of the contract to add an arbitration provision 
"should further save money on behalf of our subscribers." (See R. 34.) 
Finally, the Washington court rejected the insurer's argument that it should not have 
to prove that it mailed the endorsement to the insured. The court noted that the insurer 
"could have had each insured sign a copy of the amendment and return it to an insurance 
agent verifying that they received and understood the changes; the notice could [also] have 
been mailed certified or registered-any of which would have provided evidence of notice"— 
but the insurer elected not to. 876 P.2d at 470. Similarly, Blue Cross could have obtained 
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proof that its insured received and agreed to the change in its policy by requiring Mr. McCoy 
to acknowledge receipt of and agreement with the change in writing, but it chose not to. 
Because Mr. McCoy never agreed to arbitrate his dispute with Blue Cross and never 
received—much less agreed to-any modification of his policy to require binding arbitration, 
the arbitration provision of the plan was unenforceable as to Mr. McCoy. 
C. Mr. McCoy's Failure to Cancel His Policy When He Learned of the Arbitration 
Provision Does Not Constitute an Agreement to Arbitrate. 
Blue Cross argues that, even if Mr. McCoy did not agree to Blue Cross's proposed 
modification of the contract to require arbitration before his claim arose, by not canceling 
his contract when he learned of the arbitration provision, Mr. McCoy effectively waived any 
objection to arbitration. The argument fails on both the facts and the law. 
Mr. McCoy first received notice that his policy purportedly provided for arbitration 
in January 1995, when he received Mr. Pignanelli's letter. (See R. 81, ^ 10.) But even then, 
he did not know that the policy purported to preclude him from seeking redress in the courts. 
Mr. Pignanelli's letter said that Mr. McCoy had "the right to seek binding arbitration of the 
dispute" (R. 133), not that he was required to arbitrate the dispute. (See R. 266.) Although 
Mr. McCoy had previously received Explanation of Claims Processed forms, those forms 
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also said only that he had the "right" to have any dispute arbitrated, not that arbitration was 
his only option. (See R. 84, % 22; 135-36.)26 
A "righf' is a legally enforceable claim or power that one person has against another. 
See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136 (1972); Vega v. Morris, 910 P.2d 6, 9 
(Ariz. 1996). It is different from an obligation, which is what "a person is bound to do." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 968 (5th ed. 1979). By telling Mr. McCoy that he had a "right" 
to arbitrate, Blue Cross was telling him that he could arbitrate his dispute, not that he had to 
arbitrate it or that he was precluded from bringing a legal action to enforce his rights. Mr. 
McCoy did not receive a copy of the arbitration provision Blue Cross is relying on until after 
he brought this action. (See R. 266, f 4; 30.) By that time, Mr. McCoy had canceled his 
policy. (See R. 245, If 18.) Because Mr. McCoy never saw the arbitration provision before 
he filed this action, he did not waive any objection to it by not canceling his policy sooner. 
Even if Mr. McCoy had known that his policy required binding arbitration in January 
1995 (and he did not), he did not agree to binding arbitration of this dispute by not canceling 
his policy at that time. 
Blue Cross relies on Imperial Savings Association v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068 (D. 
Utah 1990), for its argument that Mr. McCoy's failure to object to the arbitration provision 
of the policy after he became aware of his right to arbitrate constitutes an acceptance of the 
26
 Mr. McCoy did not recall reading this boilerplate language on the Explanation 
of Claims Processed forms before this action arose but testified that, even if he had, he would 
not have understood from it that binding arbitration was his only option. (R. 84, \ 23.) 
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arbitration provision. In that case, Stewart Title Company issued a title insurance policy to 
Imperial Savings. The commitment for the policy did not contain an arbitration provision, 
but the policy did. Imperial claimed it never received the original policy, but it admitted that 
it later requested and received a copy of the policy and that its attorneys had reviewed the 
copy. See 730 F. Supp. at 1070, 1073. The court held that Imperial's receipt and retention 
of the copy for over eleven months without objection constituted an acceptance of the policy, 
including its arbitration provision, as a matter of law. Id at 1073. 
Imperial Savings is distinguishable. Mr. McCoy never received a copy of the policy 
containing the arbitration provision before he filed this action, much less did he have the 
policy reviewed by his attorneys. (See R. 81, ffij 8-9; 83-84, ^ 20; 266, ^  4.) Blue Cross 
never told Mr. McCoy that he was giving up his right to go to court by accepting his policy. 
(See R. 80, fflf 3-4; 82, f 12; 83-84, fflf 20-23; 266, f 4.) Mr. McCoy understood from Mr. 
Pignanelli's January 13, 1995, letter that he could request arbitration, not that arbitration was 
his only option. (See R. 83-84, % 20; 266, f 3.) Because Mr. McCoy did not want 
arbitration, he had no reason to ask to see the policy's arbitration provision. 
In any event, the underlying rationale of Imperial Savings and the cases it relies on 
is that if the insured does not want to arbitrate disputes under the insurance policy, he can 
always get a new policy. That it was not an option for Mr. McCoy once Mrs. McCoy was 
diagnosed with cancer. In the cases Imperial Savings relied on for the principle that 
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retention of a policy without objection after a reasonable time constitutes acceptance of the 
policy, the policy was deemed accepted before any loss occurred.27 
To the extent Imperial Savings can be read to require arbitration where the insured 
first learned of an asserted arbitration provision after his claim arose, Mr. McCoy submits 
that Imperial Savings was wrongly decided. Under R590-122-4.5 of the UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, an arbitration provision that is not disclosed until after the contract 
is entered into is not a "permissible arbitration provision" allowed by statute. Moreover, 
once a loss has occurred, the insured does not really have the choice of getting a new policy 
to cover the loss. The insurer should not be able to force its insured to make a Hobson's 
choice between accepting an arbitration provision or giving up his health insurance once the 
insured has been diagnosed with a serious illness and has incurred medical expenses of the 
type for which he bought the insurance in the first place. The insured should not have to 
choose between accepting a new, unbargained for term of the policy or canceling the policy 
and giving up the benefits he did bargain for. The contract that was in force when Mrs. 
McCoy contracted breast cancer is the contract that should govern the parties' rights and 
obligations. That contract did not have an arbitration provision. Therefore, the trial court 
correctly concluded that Mr. McCoy was not required to arbitrate his claim. 
27
 See Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47, 49 (N.M. 1968); 
Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 558, 559 (Okla. 1969). See also 
Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Flanagan, 284 So.2d 33, 34 (Miss. 1973); Porter v. Butte 
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 360 P.2d 372, 373 (N.M. 1961). 
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n. 
IF THE COURT DECIDES THAT MR. McCOY'S POLICY WAS 
EFFECTIVELY AMENDED TO REQUIRE ARBITRATION, 
THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO RULE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S OTHER ARGUMENTS AS TO WHY 
THE POLICY'S ARBITRATION PROVISION IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
In opposition to Blue Cross's motion to compel arbitration, Mr. McCoy raised a 
number of arguments as to why Blue Cross could not enforce the arbitration provision even 
if it were a part of the parties9 contract. (See R. 60-77.) The trial court did not reach those 
arguments because it found that there was no agreement to arbitrate.28 If this court reverses 
that determination, it should not compel arbitration but should remand the case for the trial 
court to consider the plaintiffs other arguments as to why any arbitration provision is 
unenforceable. 
III. 
THE ALLEGED PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION 
SHOULD NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
Blue Cross argues that this court should review the trial court's ruling in light of the 
alleged presumption in favor of arbitration. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 3-4, 24 n.3, 32.) 
That presumption should not apply in this case, for several reasons. 
28
 The trial court, for example, was initially persuaded by Mr. McCoy's argument 
that Blue Cross should not be able to enforce the arbitration provision because it breached 
its own procedures for dealing with claims such as Mr. McCoy's. (See Tr., 8-15-97, R.297, 
at 2-3.) The court did not rule on that issue, however, because it found no agreement to 
arbitrate in the first place. 
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First, "policies supporting liberal enforcement of arbitration agreements inhere only 
once the arbitration agreement is established." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d at 800. That 
is because arbitration 
'"is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration 
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.'" . . . Thus, "[although 
there is a presumption in favor of arbitration, a party will not be required to 
arbitrate when it 1ms not agreed to do so." . . . "[W]e must first conclude that 
arbitration is a remedy which has been bargained for by the parties. Only 
when such agreement on arbitration exists may we encourage arbitration by 
liberal interpretation of the arbitration provisions themselves." 
Cade v. Zions First Nat'I Bank 956 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations 
omitted). Here, for the reasons discussed above, there was no arbitration agreement. See 
supra point I. Therefore, no presumption applies. 
Second, while public policy may favor the "speedy and inexpensive resolutions of 
controversies . . . in some cases, these considerations cannot outweigh the constitutional right 
of access to the courts" where, as here, one has not clearly waived that right. Jenkins, 962 
P.2d at 800. Public policy demands a voluntary, clear and knowing waiver of the 
constitutional right of access to the courts, and no such waiver occurred in this case. 
Third, the "presumption" in favor of arbitration is based on the public policy favoring 
freedom of contract. That policy says that parties should be free to fashion their own 
agreements, and courts should enforce the agreements the parties bargain for. The arbitration 
provision in this case was not bargained for. It was unilaterally mandated by Blue Cross, 
without actual notice to Mr. McCoy. Mr. McCoy never knew of the provision before this 
dispute arose. Blue Cross freely admits that its policy was an adhesion contract, that Mr. 
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McCoy had no choice to accept coverage and reject arbitration. (See Tr., 2-6-98, R. 298, at 
8.) His only choice was to accept Blue Cross's terms (which Blue Cross could change at any 
time, without actual notice to him), try to find health insurance elsewhere or choose to forego 
health insurance altogether. If he did not like arbitration, he could not continue coverage and 
bargain away other rights. 
The Utah Supreme Court long ago recognized the reality of the situation: 
[Insurance contracts] are long, involved documents containing many 
paragraphs of fine print, among which is immersed the arbitration provision. 
The insured is usually simply in the position of desiring to purchase some . . . 
insurance, and insofar as the policy is concerned, is not in a position to frame 
his own policy or to propose conditions of his own. He is obliged to take the 
policy that is offered with its various and sundry provisions, many of which 
he is quite unaware of. . . . The insured is not required to read, nor to 
understand, nor to sign anything, but only to pay his premium. The practical 
reality is that the lay purchaser is in an inferior bargaining position and 
simply accepts unilaterally the policy as prepared by the company. Under 
such circumstances, it would be inequitable and unjust to hold that he had 
given up so important a privilege as his right to seek justice in court unless it 
clearly appeared that he was aware of what he was doing, and that he had 
voluntarily made such a commitment 
Barnhart v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873, 877 (1965) 
(emphasis added).29 
29
 The Draft Final Report of the Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution 
(see supra note 25) also recognizes that ADR systems such as arbitration in health-care plans 
"will invariably not be the product of a negotiated agreement" and that "key aspects of 
procedural due process," including a "knowing and voluntary agreement to use ADR," are 
essential "to ensure a 'level playing field' for resolving health care disputes by ADR." Draft 
Final Report, § XH.A. & C. 
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There are good reasons why an insurer such as Blue Cross would insist on mandatory, 
binding arbitration. It does not want its contract and its practices subjected to the sort of 
disinterested scrutiny they would have to undergo in a court of law. 
The rule of law is built on the doctrine of stare decisis ("to stand by things decided"). 
Under stare decisis, a court is required to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same 
points arise again in litigation. Similarly, under the related doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel, a party that has litigated a matter and lost is bound by that result in future 
litigation. Stare decisis "is a maxim of practically universal application." BRYAN A. 
GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 827 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting RUPERT 
CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 3 (4th ed. 1991)). It is recognized 
almost everywhere, except in arbitration, that is. 
Arbitrators are not bound by precedent. They are bound neither by prior judicial 
decisions nor by the decisions of other arbitrators. Arbitrators are not required to state the 
grounds for their decisions, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-10, and the fact that an 
arbitration award is contrary to law is not grounds for vacating the award, id. § 78-3 la-14(1). 
Cf. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996) (an 
arbitration award may only be overturned for "manifest disregard of the law," a much higher 
standard than an error of law). 
An arbitration award does not become binding precedent. An insurance company that 
loses an arbitration is not bound by that decision in a subsequent arbitration involving the 
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same issues. The company can take unlimited bites of the apple, in the hopes of winning at 
least once. 
Arbitrations, unlike court proceedings, are not conducted in public. They are not 
subject to the scrutiny of public opinion. 
Thus, by requiring mandatory arbitration of disputes, which, Blue Cross admits, is not 
a bargained-for provision of the contract but is unilaterally imposed on insureds on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis {see Tr., 2-6-98, R. 298, at 8), Blue Cross can insure that its practices, 
policies and procedures never see the light of day. It can effectively guarantee that it will 
be able to follow and apply its own interpretations of its policies indefinitely and will never 
be required to follow a court's construction of its policies. 
Moreover, by requiring binding arbitration a company such as Blue Cross can 
guarantee itself a favorable forum. Although arbitrators are supposed to be neutral, an 
arbitrator who repeatedly rules against an insurance company will soon find himself out of 
a job. The arbitrator is dependent on the insurance company for repeat business. An 
arbitrator stays in business if he can work with insurance companies, since the insurance 
company can veto the choice of arbitrator. Insurance companies are constantly before 
arbitrators, but it is highly unlikely that the arbitrator will ever see the same insured more 
than once. An arbitrator who gives a significant ruling against a party from whom he or she 
receives a significant amount of business might as well find a new profession. 
Finally, many of the due process safeguards found injudicial proceedings are largely 
absent in arbitration. The relative "speedy and inexpensive" resolution of controversies 
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arbitration makes possible is achieved by severely limiting discovery, ignoring evidentiary 
rules, giving the arbitrator almost unbridled discretion to make decisions, without explaining 
the bases for those decisions, and providing only the most limited appeal rights. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 78-3 la-7, -8, -10, -13, -14 & -15. 
Blue Cross suggests that arbitration is actually a benefit to insureds. It suggests that 
insureds should want arbitration because they often do not have "the financial resources to 
wage a traditional protracted legal battle against an insurance company." (Br. of Appellant 
at 24 n.3.) However, an insured seeking arbitration may be required to front all the costs of 
the arbitration. (See R. 35.) He may or may not be reimbursed for those costs, see UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-11, and may be stuck with having to pay the insurer's attorney fees if 
he challenges the arbitrator's award in court, see id § 78-3 la-16. On the other hand, an 
insured who takes his insurance company to court may be able to recover his attorney's fees 
as consequential damages. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 
1996). 
Blue Cross also suggests that the arbitration provision in this case was fair because 
it gave either side the right to request arbitration. In fact, as a practical matter the arbitration 
provision in this case worked only one way. Under Blue Cross's "Member Grievance 
Procedure," the first three steps all involve internal decisions by Blue Cross. (See R. 46.) 
Arbitration becomes an option only if the insured disputes Blue Cross's decision at each step 
of the way. Blue Cross would never have any reason to appeal its own decision. Indeed, 
Blue Cross's grievance procedure acknowledges that the procedures are meant only for the 
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insured. (See R. 46 ("The following . . . steps [are] available to you, the Member").) 
Because the insured is the only one who would have reason to challenge Blue Cross's 
decision, it is the insured who is most adversely affected by the arbitration provision. 
In any event, the fact that arbitration may have benefits in some cases does not alter 
the fact that a party who agrees to arbitration gives up significant constitutional rights and 
therefore must clearly, knowingly and voluntarily agree to binding arbitration. 
For all these reasons, this court should not apply any alleged presumption in favor of 
arbitration in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order denying Blue Cross's motion to 
compel arbitration and stay these proceedings should be afBrmed. Alternatively, if this court 
finds that the trial court erred, it should remand the case for the trial court to consider Mr. 
McCoy's other arguments as to why the arbitration provision is unenforceable. 
DATED this 16th day of December, 1998. 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Esq. 
Paul M. Simmons, Esq. 
(Original signature) 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as 
the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or 
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 
59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1996) 
78-3 la-3. Arbitration agreement. 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is 
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to set 
aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
78-31 a-4. Court order to arbitrate. 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the 
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the 
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement is 
involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear 
motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court. Otherwise, the 
motion shall be made to a court with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceeding 
involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. However, if the issue is 
severable from the other issues in the action or proceeding, only the issue subject to 
arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, the order for 
arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim that an 
issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have not 
been shown. 
UTAH CODE ANN. (SUPP. 1985) (REPEALED 1985, EFFECTIVE 1986) 
31-37-16. Filing forms and schedules with commissioner — Procedure — Hospital or 
medical-surgical benefits — Provision for dependents required. 
(l)(a) On and after the effective date of this act, no corporation subject to its 
provisions shall deliver or issue for delivery in this state any subscription certificate or 
membership certificate describing health benefits available, or any endorsement, rider, or 
application which becomes a part thereof, until a copy of the form and the schedule of 
rates, dues, fees, or other periodic charges, to be paid by subscribers or members, has 
been filed with approval by the commissioner. 
(b) At the expiration of fifteen days the form so filed shall be deemed approved 
unless prior thereto it has been affirmatively approved or disapproved by order of the 
commissioner. The commissioner may withdraw approval at any time for cause. 
(c) The commissioner's order disapproving any form or withdrawing previous 
approval shall state the grounds for disapproval or withdrawal. 
(d) No form shall be issued, delivered, or used to which the commissioner's 
approval does not exist. 
(e) The commissioner may, by order, exempt from the requirements of this section 
for so long as he deems proper, any document or form specified in the order, to which in 
his opinion this section may not practicably be applied, or the filing and approval of 
which are, in his opinion, not desirable or necessary for the protection of the public. 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1994) 
31A-21-314. Prohibited provisions. 
No insurance policy subject to this chapter may contain any provision: 
(2) depriving Utah courts of jurisdiction over an action against the insurer, 
except as provided in permissible arbitration provisions . . . . 
2 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE (SUPP. OCT. 1,1997) 
R590-122-4. Rule. 
2. Optional binding arbitration at the exclusive election of an insured party is 
a "permissible arbitration provision," in which case the disclosure provisions in paragraph 
5 below shall not be applicable. 
3. Both compulsory and optional binding arbitration at the election of either 
the insured or the insurer are "permissible arbitration provisions." 
5. Except as excluded in paragraph 2 above, each application or binder 
pertaining to an insurance policy which contains a permissible arbitration provision must 
include or have attached a prominent statement substantially as follows: 
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND THE COMPANY MAY 
BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COURT ACTION 
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF (THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
OR OTHER RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR), A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE 
ON REQUEST FROM THE COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED BY 
ARBITRATION SHALL BE BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE COMPANY. 
THE ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES IF ALLOWED 
BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE ENTERED AS A JUDGEMENT IN ANY COURT 
OF PROPER JURISDICTION. 
Such statement must be disclosed prior to the execution of the insurance contract 
between the insurer and the policy holder and, in the case of group insurance, shall be 
contained in the certificate of insurance or other disclosure of benefits. 
UTAH CODE ANN. (SUPP. 1997) 
31A-21-106. Incorporation by reference. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or as otherwise mandated by law, 
no purported modification of a contract during the term of the policy affects the 
obligations of a party to the contract unless the modification is in writing and agreed to 
by the party against whose interest the modification operates. 
3 
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This Bulletin is being released for the purpose of stating the 
Department's position in regard to certain arbitration provisions 
incorporated within policy forms and intended for use in this 
state. Many insurers have submitted forms which contain mandatory 
binding arbitration provisions requiring claimants to submit to 
these procedures as a condition to further rights under the policy. 
Arbitration, as an alternative dispute method, is in the public 
interest and a recognized option to a judicial determination of 
issues. It is hoped that insureds will take advantage of 
arbitration procedures, recognizing that it may in many instances 
promote an expedient, efficient result of a dispute. To that end, 
the Department favors alternative dispute resolution procedures 
that are in the public interest- However, mandatory binding 
arbitration provisions are contrary to the Insurance Code. 
Sections 31A-21-313(3)(c) and 31A-21-314(2) of the Insurance Code 
prohibit insurers from enforcing policy provisions which deny 
access to the courts by insureds. The Department has determined 
that mandatory binding arbitration procedures which require 
insureds to relinquish their rights to pursue an action against 
the insurer in the courts are violative of the above cited 
statutes. Consequently, mandatory binding arbitration is not in 
the public interest. The Department has no objection to contract 
grievance procedures which allow the insured the option, at some 
step, to pursue binding arbitration or a judicial resolution of 
issues. 
Policy forms submitted to the Department which contain mandatory 
binding arbitration provisions will be disapproved under Section 
31A-21-201(2)(a)(iv). Mandatory binding arbitration provisions in 
previously approved forms are unenforceable. They will be 
construed under Section 31A-21-107 and applied as if in compliance 
with the Insurance Code. All policy forms must fully comply with 
these requirements no later than July 1, 1987. 
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